The "Deception Exception": A New Approach to Section 2(b)
Values and Its Impact on Defamation Law
Jeremy Streeter
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the tort of defamation is inconsistent with
Charter values because it fails to adequately take into account
the guarantee of freedom of expression. Although defamation law does
protect the reputations and privacy interests of individuals, these
values must be weighed against the values that underlie the s. 2(b)
guarantee. This article revisits s. 2(b), and argues that the values
normally associated with freedom of expression - namely the quest for
truth, the promotion of individual self-development, and participation
in the community - are inadequate, as they are not content-neutral.
The article argues that the true values behind s. 2(b) are content-neutrality
and sincerity. Using these new values, a new approach to freedom of
expression is suggested, one which protects all expression equally and
requires all infringements of sincere expression to be justified through
a strict s. 1 analysis.
The new values behind freedom of expression are then applied in the
context of defamation law. The tort of defamation, as presently constituted,
is found to be inconsistent with these new values. The article concludes
that a defence of reasonableness or due diligence would strike a better
balance, protecting reputations and privacy while respecting the true
values behind the s. 2(b) guarantee.
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Citation: (2003) 61(1) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 79.
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