Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the
Experience of the United States in the 1990s
Benjamin Alarie
ABSTRACT
Until now the legal and regulatory measures that have been taken in
the United States and Canada to combat excessive executive compensation
have been largely ineffectual. The one possible exception is the tax
deductibility cap of §162(m) of the US Internal Revenue Code, which
was introduced in 1993. A similar but improved provision ought to be
considered by Canadian policymakers. There are several lessons Canadian
policymakers can take from the US experience with §162(m). First,
policymakers should consider tightening, although not eliminating, the
performance-based exemption. Second, policymakers should not anticipate
a deductibility cap to raise a considerable amount of tax revenue or
totally prevent CEOs from engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. Third,
policymakers should strongly consider prohibiting executives from unravelling
the incentives associated with performance-based compensation by entering
into hedging transactions. Finally, Canadian policymakers would be wise
to carefully consider the effects a deductibility cap would have on
the competitive international environment in which Canada competes for
corporate patronage.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citation: (2003) 61(1) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 39.
Copyright © 2002. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review.
All rights reserved.