Les droits à l'égalité et l'article premier de la Charte Canadienne des droits et libertés

GENEVIEVE TREMBLAY

ABSTRACT

On 25 May 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down three decisions dealing with the guarantee of equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Miron, Egan and Thibaudeau. In these judgments, four out of nine judges proposed adding a new criterion to the traditional analytical framework for interpreting s. 15 (1) - namely, the extent to which distinctions based on immutable personal characteristics are relevant to the legislative purpose and to the functional values underlying the legislation. The article examines the foundations of the relevance criterion, its definition according to the minority in the trilogy, and the role the minority envisions relevance playing in s. 15(1) jurisprudence. It also examines the possible consequences of an the dangers inherent in integrating the test of relevance into s. 15(1) analysis. Finally, the article asserts that s.1 of the Charter provides a comprehensive mechanism for balancing individual, social, and state interests, and allows for a contextual consideration of the rights, liberties, and values underlying the Charter.

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Citation: (1997) 55(2) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 303.
Copyright © 1997. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review.
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