The Rules of Law: Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Weinrib's Formalism

JAMES PENNER

ABSTRACT

In the first section of this article, the author derives principles of rule following and interpretation of language from the work of Wittgenstein and Davidson. These principles are used to describe the nature of practical reason. The author then examines Posner's analysis of the "conventionalist" response to his argument that law has declined as an autonomous discipline in order to show that Posner conflates the practice of practical reasoning with its results. Finally, Weinrib's conception of formalism is shown to represent the structure for a grammar of law on Wittgenstein's principles of rule following.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Citation: (1988) 46(2) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 488.
Copyright © 1988. University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review.
All rights reserved.